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COMMENT
SOME ASPECTS OF THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE
The presence of an omnibus clause in automobile insurance policies
can be attributed to the highly competitive nature of the insurance
industry. Basically, the omnibus clause is designed to give insurance
coverage to an un-named person who is driving the policyholder's
automobile with the latter's consent. A standard clause reads,
With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and for
property damages liability the unqualified word "insured" includes
the named insured and also includes any person while using the auto-
mobile and any organization legally responsible for the use thereof,
provided the actual use is by the named insured or with his permission
or the permission of an adult member of his household.
Coverage under the clause is broad as it includes (1) persons not named
in the policy; (2) those who pay no consideration to the insurer; (3)
those who are unaware of the clause and do not rely upon it; and
(4) those to whom the insurer will not issue a policy.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore two problems presented
by the omnibus clause. First, to obtain coverage under the clause, the
named insured must grant permission to the permittee to use his car.
The concept of permission has been particularly troublesome; indeed,
there is little harmony among the courts as to its meaning and appli-
cation. The writer proposes to analyze the approaches taken by the
courts toward the concept of permission, with a special emphasis on
the Washington cases. Second, an interesting and related problem
posed by the recent case of Wood v. Kok1 has suggested a study of the
situation in which the named insured allows another to use his car,
and he in turn delegates operation of the automobile to a third person.
THE PERMISSION PROBLEM
The first prerequisite to coverage is that the person giving permission
has the capacity under the omnibus clause to grant it. There is no
question that the named insured has the necessary capacity, provided
he has beneficial ownership of the car. Under the standard clause, an
adult member of the named insured's household may also give per-
mission. In Hinton v. Carmody,' a minor of 20 years and 9 months
owned a car which his father had insured. The policy contained a
158 Wn.2nd 12, 360 P.2d 317 (1961).
2 186 Wash. 242, 57 P2d 1240 (1936).
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standard omnibus clause. The minor allowed a friend to use the
car, and the court held that the driver drove without permission of the
named insured or a member of his household; thus coverage was
denied.
Permission is revocable, and like many agency relations, it terminates
on the death of the grantor. In Collins v. Northwest Cas. Co.,' the
named insured gave her son permission to use her car. The son had an
accident after the death of his mother and claimed that he was covered
on the ground that death did not revoke the permission or that since he
was a member of the named insured's household, he could drive with
coverage. Rejecting both arguments, the court held (1) that to obtain
coverage, the son should have received permission from the executor
of his mother's estate; and (2) that since death of the head of the
household terminates it, the son could not, as a member of a non-exist-
ent household, give himself the requisite permission. The underlying
reason that permission ceases on the death of the named insured is
that a casualty insurance policy is a personal contract, dependent upon
the existence of the parties; thus it terminates on the death of the
insured unless there is a provision to the contrary.4
Unique problems of capacity arise when the person granting permis-
sion has given up possession of and title to the car but has not cancelled
his policy covering the vehicle. The general rule seems to be that under
such a circumstance, the policy holder has no authority to grant per-
mission.' The basis of the rule is that capacity to give permission term-
inates with the cessation of the grantor's beneficial interest in the auto-
mobile.
A second condition of coverage involves the scope of permission, a
problem closely akin to an agent's scope of authority. Permission, by
itself, encompasses both express and implied permission. In the land-
mark case of Odden v. Union Indem. Co.,6 the court found no express
permission, but rather relied on the past conduct of the parties consist-
ing of three months of continuous use of the automobile by the per-
mittee and his friends, which was known to the named insured. One
3 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986 (1935).
4 Permission by one who is mentally competent but subsequently becomes incom-
petent is not revoked by the later change in circumstances. Tooney v. Heney, 166 F.
Supp. 85 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
r Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Guthiel, 2 N.Y.2d 584, 141 N.E.2d 909, 147 N.Y.S.2d 341
(Ct. App. 1955) ; Byrd v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.
1950). Cf. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Lantz, 246 F.2d 182 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 883 (1957).0 156 Wash. 10, 286 Pac. 59 (1930).
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of the friends had an accident with the vehicle, and the court held
that he was covered by the omnibus clause.7 Implied permission may
also be found from a relationship between the named insured and the
permittee, or by finding acquiescence on the part of the named insured
in allowing the permittee use of the automobile. The court was liberal
in finding permission in the Odden case. However, in McKee v. Garri-
son,8 the court recognized the above rules but applied them strictly so
as to reach a very different result. In McKee, R gave his car to G, a
self-proclaimed auto mechanic, so G could repair a noisy engine. R
asked G to look at the brakes because they were grabbing. In holding
that G had no implied permission to use the vehicle, the court reasoned
that since G was a novice mechanic, unfamiliar with the manner in
which automobiles were repaired, R did not intend that he should do
any driving. Normally, the only way in which one could test brakes
would be to drive the car, and the relationship of repairman-patron
should raise an inference of permission.
Express permission must be of an affirmative character; i.e., clear
and direct.9 Whether there has been express permission or not is a
question of fact for the jury.'0
A third prerequisite to coverage under an omnibus clause is also
connected with the concept of permission. The problem can best be
illustrated by several examples. Suppose the named insured asks P,
a permittee, to run a personal errand for him. P completes the errand,
but instead of returning the car immediately, proceeds on a trip of his
own and has an accident. Or suppose that there are two roads, one
twice as long as the other, which P can use. P takes the longer route
and has an accident. Or, altering the hypothetical slightly, assume the
named insured specifically says, "Bring my car straight back from the
errand." P finishes the errand and on the way to his girlfriend's house
has an accident. Must the permittee be doing exactly what he was
authorized to do, or is he allowed a degree of latitude within the scope
of his authority? The courts have divided three ways on what conduct
will place a permittee within the ambit of the omnibus clause.
7 In Trotter v. Union Indem. Co., 33 F.2d 363, aff'd, 35 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1929),
the federal court heard the same case as presented in Odden v. Union Indem. Co. and
found that as between the named insured and the permittee, no permission, express or
implied, to allow the permittee's friends to use the automobile existed; thus the friend
was denied coverage under the omnibus clause.
8 37 Wn.2d 37, 221 P.2d 514 (1950).
9 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 186 Va. 658, 43 S.E2d 863 (1947);
Hinton v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 175 Va. 205, 8 S.E2d 279 (1940).
30 Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wn.2d 533, 197 P.2d 999 (1948) ; Odden v. Union Indem.
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First, a minority of courts has adopted the "strict conversion" rule
(so-called because any deviation from the intended use makes the user
a converter), which the Washington court has defined in the following
terms;
[F]or a driver's use to be with the permission of the named insured,
that permission, express or implied, must have been by the named
insured not only to the taking and use of the car in the first instance
but also to the particular use being made of the car at the time in
question.11
The emphasis in the strict conversion rule is on the use at the moment
of impact. If the permittee is not doing exactly what he was given
permission to do, coverage is denied. The rationale for the rule is that
coverage is co-extensive with the owner's actual permission, so that
deviation from the permitted activity will terminate coverage.
In Cypert v. Roberts,2 the first case in which the Washington Su-
preme Court had an opportunity to construe an omnibus clause, the
court seemingly adopted the strict conversion rule. The permittee was
authorized to take the named insured's car for a certain length of time
and then was directed to return it. Upon returning the car and being
unable to locate the named insured, the permittee used it again. The
court stated:
That she did not have such permission, express or implied, . . at the
time, and under the circumstances, or for the purposes existing at the
time of the collision was clearly established, and must be so held . . .
as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.) 13
Although Cypert might be distinguished on the ground that the per-
mittee lacked permission originally because she returned the vehicle
and thereby ended her rightful possession, such an interpretation is too
narrow since it does not give full effect to the court's statement quoted
above. Since Cypert, the Washington court has retreated from the
strict conversion doctrine, and indeed has rejected it."-
Second, a number of courts adhere to the "liberal" or "initial per-
mission" rule. 5 Under this theory, if the permittee receives permission
to use the automobile in the first instance, any subsequent use is deemed
to be with the permission of the named insured, even though the use
Co., 156 Wash. 10, 286 Pac. 59 (1930).1 1 Wallin v. Knudtson, 46 Wn2d 80, 82, 278 P2d 344, 345, (1955).
12169 Wash. 33, 13 P2d 55 (1932).
laId. at 38, 13 P2d at 56.
3.
4 Wallin v. Knudtson, 46 Wn.2d 80, 278 P.2d 344 (1955).
15 Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938) ; Hodges v. Ocean Acc. & Guar.
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may be for a purpose completely foreign to that originally contem-
plated, or at a time or place not intended by the named insured when
he parted with possession. The initial permission rule was first adopted
in Tennessee," but was subsequently restricted there." The rule is
grounded on a pure public policy argument; i.e., automobile insurance
is as much for the benefit of the public as for the insured, and when an
automobile accident occurs, the issue of "permission" is immaterial.
Little imagination is needed to see that once such reasoning is adopted,
its application is limitless. In Fulco v. City Ice Service, Inc.," s an
employer allowed his truck to be left in an alley with the keys in the
ignition. An unknown person took the truck. The truck later struck
and injured the plaintiff. The court found that the truck was being
used with implied permission from the named insured because he
knew of the practice of his drivers and acquiesced in it. Evidently, in
Louisiana, the carelessness of a named insured gives rise to implied
permission, and this in conjunction with the initial permission rule
makes coverage under an omnibus clause absolute. It seems safe to
conclude that had the defendant insurance carrier known that its con-
tract would be so interpreted, it would not have entered it.
That the Washington court has not yet accepted the initial permis-
sion rule is demonstrated in Yurick v. McElroy"9 and Wallin v. Knudt-
son."0 In Yurick, the permittee was given permission to drive the
named insured's car on New Year's Eve; however, the car broke down
just after the permittee took possession of it. He was instructed to get
the car running and return it on New Year's Day. Instead of returning
the automobile directly to the named insured, the permittee drove it
on several personal errands. On one of these, the plaintiff was negli-
gently struck by the permittee. The court found that the permittee
had limited permission only, and liability could be imposed only if he
were operating the vehicle within the scope of permission. The court
said,
The delivery of an automobile by the owner . . . to accomplish a
particular mission for the owner, would not, ordinarily, without the
Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E2d 28 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 693 (1941). This rule
has been aptly termed the "Hell or High Water Rule" in 7 APPLEMAN, IxSURANCE LAW
& PRAcTiCE 308 (2d ed. 1962).16 Stovall v. New York Indem. Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928).
17 Moore v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 Tenn. 519, 246 S.W.2d 960 (1952).
18 53 So. 2d 488 (La. 1951), withdrawm by order of court, 53 So. 2d xxii (1951).
19 32 Wn.2d 511, 202 P2d 464 (1949).
2o 46 Wn2d 80, 278 P.2d 344 (1955).
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granting of further permission to use the car for the loanee's own
purpose, be considered as an implied grant of such permission.2'
In the Wallin case, the named insured gave permission to another to
drive his car from Fort Lewis to nearby Tacoma. The permittee drove
to Tacoma and then started on a forty-five mile trip to Seattle. When
he was seventeen miles out of Tacoma, he negligently struck the plain-
tiff's decedent. The court rejected the initial permission rule, but it
left the door open for its subsequent adoption, stating,
[W] e do not... desire to foreclose re-examination of [the initial
permission rule] in the light of the changing conditions should occasion
require it. The statutes of many states requiring owners of automo-
biles to carry indemnity or liability insurance making an insured of
anyone who has possession of an automobile with the permission,
express or implied, of the owner, are placing the stamp of approval on
the rationale of those cases as a matter of public policy.22
The third approach to the problem is embodied in the "minor devi-
ation" rule. Under this rule, a permittee is covered so long as he is
either operating the car for the precise purpose which it was given to
him, or, if he has made a slight deviation from that purpose, he is
likewise protected. The leading case on the minor deviation rule is
Dickinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 3 in which the named insured loaned
his car to the permittee so he could go to his home and change his
clothes. The permittee started toward home, but stopped at a saloon
where he met Dickinson and several others. The permittee agreed to
take Dickinson to his home, which was in the general direction of his
own. After driving more than a mile in a direction away from their
homes to let the others off, the permittee and Dickinson stopped for
several drinks. Finally, they started toward home. It was on this trip
that the permittee collided with a tree, mortally injuring Dickinson.
The court reasoned that had the insurance company wanted to protect
itself fully, it could have provided that a permittee would be protected
under the omnibus clause only if he were operating the vehicle for the
exact purpose for which it was loaned. The court thought that the
deviation described was too slight to annul the protection afforded by
the policy.
The rationale for the minor deviation rule is twofold. First, upon the
loan of the car, the named insured may specifically state the object of
21 Yurick v. McElroy, 32 Wn.2d 511, 518, 202 P.2d 464, 468 (1948).2 2 WaIlin v. Knudtson, 46 Wn.2d 80, 82, 278 P.2d 344, 345 (1955).
23 101 Conn. 369, 125 At. 866 (1924).
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the loan, but the manner of accomplishing it is usually within the dis-
cretion of the permittee; thus coverage should not be denied if the
purpose is completed in a manner slightly different from that contem-
plated. This is analogous to the concept used in agency to ascertain
whether an agent is acting within the scope of his employment. Second,
the rule more nearly accords with the intention of the insurance com-
pany when it entered the contract than does, for example, the initial
permission rule.
The Washington court in Wallin v. Knudtson2' adopted the minor
deviation rule:
As regards the breadth to be given the word 'permission' as used in
the clause of the character herein considered-where one asks for and
receives permission to use the car for a purpose indicated by him in his
request, it will not be held that any deviation or departure from the
purpose so indicated by him annuls the permission and puts him in
the position of unlawfully using the car.25
There are several disadvantages to this rule, the most noteworthy of
which is that each case presents a particular factual problem of whether
the deviation was great enough to annul coverage. In Wallin, the court
provides a guide:
It seems to us that a much greater deviation, measured in terms of
purpose, time, and distance, can be justified as permissible in such a
case than in a situation where the named insured has delivered pos-
session of the car to another person for a specific purpose indicated by
the named insured.26
The formula given by the court stresses three factors-purpose, time,
and distance. If the named insured restricts the purpose alone for
which the car may be used, then any deviation from that purpose will
be closely scrutinized, with the probability of denial of coverage under
the omnibus clause. However, if the named insured imposes restric-
tions on time and/or distance or a combination of those two with
purpose, then deviations from the named insured's original permission
will be deemed minor so long as the car can be returned within the time
limit.
It is the opinion of this writer that the minor deviation rule most
closely accords with the intent of the parties to the insurance contract.
2446 Wn2d 80, 278 P2d 344 (1955). See also Foote v. Grant, 56 Wn.2d 630, 354
P.2d 893 (1960).25 Wallin v. Knudtson, 46 Wn.2d 80, 83, 278 P.2d 344, 346 (1955), quoting 72 A.L.R.
1401 (1931).
26 Id. at 87, 278 P.2d at 347.
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Unlike the other two rules, the minor deviation rule strikes an even
balance between denying effect to the omnibus clause and using it as
a means of obtaining insurance for all automobile drivers, regardless
of the conditions under which they were given the car. Recognizing
that society has become more mobile, the rule allows a permittee a
reasonable degree of latitude in use of the car, with a special emphasis
on the time factor. Finally, the rule recognizes a fundamental division
of labor between the judicial and legislative branches of government;
i.e., whether or not a state should have compulsory insurance, or any
aspect of it, is a matter for legislative determination, and is not a de-
cision which the court should attempt by a distorted construction of the
omnibus clause.
THE SuB-PE1-nssIoN PROBLEm
The second problem to be discussed arises when a permittee of a
named insured allows a second, or sub-permittee, to use the automobile.
The point at issue is whether the omnibus clause will cover the sub-
permittee when the named insured either did not expressly authorize
the original permittee to delegate the use or operation of the car, or
expressly forbade such a delegation.
The most common situation is that in which the named insured says
nothing about sub-delegation. Should silence be a denial to the per-
mittee of the authority to sub-delegate, or can silence create an infer-
ence of power to sub-delegate? This question has reached the courts
on numerous occasions, and the answer still is not settled.
A springboard for discussion of the problem is the recent case of
Wood v. Kok." In Wood, the named insured granted K permission to
use her car for the purpose of testing it to see whether he would buy it.
K allowed M, who was a minor of fourteen, unlicensed, and unknown
to the named insured, to drive. While M was driving, she negligently
struck the plaintiff. The omnibus clause in the named insured's policy
stated that the
unqualified word 'insured' includes . . . (2) with respect to the
described automobile, any other person or organization legally respon-
sible for its use, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the
named insured or with his permission. .... 28
The court ignored any discussion of the fact that K was granted per-
mission only to test the car; rather it decided that the term "use"
27 58 Wn2d 12, 360 P2d 576 (1961).
28 Id. at 14, 360 P2d at 577.
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meant that so long as the named insured had granted K permission to
drive the car, the clause would be operative if the vehicle was being
used to benefit K. Four judges dissented on the ground that K was
not given general permission to use the car, so that he lacked authority
to delegate operation of it.
The holding in the Wood case seems unwarranted for two reasons.
First, Washington has not accepted the liberal rule on scope of per-
mission, so that when K was given the car, he retained its use for a
particular purpose; viz., to test drive it to determine whether he would
buy it. This excludes, by implication, the power to delegate to an
unlicensed and inexperienced driver. Indeed, the dissent points out,
"The record is explicit that there was no request for an unlimited use,
nor was permission for an unlimited use ever granted."" Under the
minor deviation rule, a permittee should not be entitled to relinquish
possession of the automobile to another since the named insured en-
trusted it to him, and such a change in drivers would be a deviation of
greater consequence than the rule allows.
Second, the intent of the insurance carrier when it issued its policy
to the named insured cannot be ignored. The insurance company, by
including the omnibus clause, relied upon the discretion of the parti-
cular named insured to delegate the use of the vehicle. It did not intend
to insure the risk created when the permittee of the named insured
delegated its use to a sub-permittee. The statement of Judge Chambliss
in American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones" makes this point clearly and
convincingly,
The element of risk underlies all forms of insurance. The insurer has
a right to assume that the risk he undertakes shall not be enlarged. The
extent of the risk is the basis of all tabulated premium charges. And
this is one of the forms of insurance, of which fire policies are an illus-
tration, wherein there is a recognized personal element resting on
standards of character, responsibility, and competence. In this class
of cases, theoretically ... the insurer looks first to the standing and
reputation of the named assured and trusts him to select and delegate to
responsible employees, only the "use" or operation-controlling, guid-
ing, driving-of its cars covered, and on this theory agrees to cover
such "additional assureds." No power passes, in contemplation of the
parties, to such an agent to delegate in turn this responsibility. Such a
diversion of use can hardly be said to be impliedly with the consent of
the named assured, or within the contemplation of the insurer. It is a
29Id. at 17, 360 P2d at 579.
80 163 Tenn. 605, 45 S.W.2d 52, 53 (1932).
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departure too radical and foreign, and involves an unjustifiable exten-
sion of the risk covered by the contract.
Although these two reasons seem persuasive, a majority of courts
have circumvented them and have imposed liability on insurance car-
riers when a sub-permittee has been driving. First, in Odden v. Union
Indem. Co., 1 the court found that a course of conduct of loans by the
permittee, known to the insured but unobjected to, constituted implied
permission to allow delegation. The doctrine of implied permission has
been extended so far that in at least one jurisdiction mere transfer of
possession of the vehicle to a permittee raises an implication that he
can sub-delegate its use. 2 Such a result is incompatible with Washing-
ton's minor deviation rule.3
A second manner in which the problem of sub-delegation can be
avoided turns on the meaning and distinction between "use" and
"operation." Where the omnibus clause employs the word "use," it is
deemed to have a broader meaning than "operate." "Operate" refers
to actual manual direction of the car, while "use" refers to employment
for an object or purpose of the user. Thus, in order to be using a car,
one does not have to be operating it. Most omnibus clauses require
that the named insured has given permission for use of the automobile.
If a permittee allows a sub-permittee to drive, and he is within the
scope of permission which the named insured gave, then there is cov-
erage as he is using the car for its intended purpose.3" Under such rea-
soning, it is immaterial who is operating the car.
Another group of cases in which the distinction between "use" and
"operate" creates liability for the insurance carrier arises when the
permittee is riding with the sub-permittee. 3 The reasoning is that the
permittee is deriving benefit from the car even though he is not driving
it. The concept of physical presence and benefit has been carried to
such an extreme that it covers the situation where the permittee is
sleeping while the sub-permittee is driving."
A third theory for omnibus clause coverage is based solely on the
21 156 Wash. 10, 286 Pac. 59 (1930).
32 Boyer v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 359, 178 N.E. 523 (1931).
33Trotter v. Union Indem. Co., 33 F.2d 363 (W.D. Wash. 1929), aff'd, 35 F2d 104
(9th Cir. 1929).34 Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. of New York, 33
N.J. 507, 166 A.2d 355 (1960) (driver expressly forbidden to drive.)3 M aryland Cas. Co. v. Marshbank, 226 F.2d 637 (3rd Cir. 1955) ; Brown v. Ken-
nedy, 141 Ohio 457, 48 N.E.2d 857 (1943). Contra, American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones,
163 Tenn. 605, 45 S.W.2d 52 (1932).
3o American Cas. Co. v. Windham, 107 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. dezied, 309
U.S. 674 (1940).
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benefit concept; viz., so long as the car is being driven for the benefit
of the permittee, the sub-permittee is protected." The courts which
advocate this theory do not require a permittee to be physically present
when a sub-permittee is driving. 8 Under the benefit doctrine, the
sub-permittee would be covered even though the permittee was for-
bidden to delegate operation of the car. The apparent rationale for this
doctrine is that original permission includes by inference the authority
to delegate.
The case of Wood v. Kok 9 presents the most difficult situation for
omnibus clause coverage because the sub-permittee is unlicensed. Even
assuming the strongest case, i.e., that initial permission by the named
insured includes by implication authority to delegate use to a sub-
permittee, can such an inference also encompass the power to allow
an unlicensed person to drive? Even in the strongest case, such an
implication is unwarranted as being totally unreasonable." In such
a situation, an analysis of coverage should originate with the insurance
contract to determine the rights and duties of the parties. The risk of
delegation to an unlicensed driver by a permittee was not within the
contemplation of the parties when the original insurance policy was
issued, since it is highly unlikely that the insurance carrier would have
issued a policy covering a risk so extreme in its inception unless an
extra premium were charged.
In conclusion, the result reached in the Wood case creates serious
doubts as to whether Washington will continue to follow the minor
deviation rule in the future. In Wallin v. Knudtson,, ' the court left
the way open for adoption of the liberal or initial permission rule. In
Wood, the court did not discuss either rule but seemingly gave sanc-
tion to the liberal rule. The writer urges that the minor deviation rule
be retained and followed because it more closely accords with the
intent of the named insured and the insurance carrier when the par-
ticular policy was issued, and because it leaves to legislative determin-
ation Washington's position on any form of compulsory insurance.
DAVID C. LYCETTE
37 Harrison v. Carroll, 139 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1943).
38 Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Zurn, 87 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1937).
39 58 Wn.2d 12, 360 P.2d 576 (1961).
40 See Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Western Underwriters, 53 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Ida.
1944) ; Kneeland v. Bernardi, 317 Mass. 517, 58 N.E2d 823 (1945).4146 Wn.2d 80, 278 P2d 344 (1955).
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